

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.716
31 August 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 31 August 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Benjelloun-Touimi (Morocco)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 716th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. First of all, allow me to make a few comments on behalf of my country, the Kingdom of Morocco.

It is an honour and a privilege for me to take up the mantle of President of the Conference on Disarmament for the final weeks of our 1995 session. It is also a redoubtable task, because we have to record in our annual report to the United Nations General Assembly the results of our collective efforts to discharge the responsibilities we have assumed. However, I am sure that I will enjoy your full cooperation and that of the secretariat in carrying out my tasks throughout my period of office, which will continue until 31 December this year.

The contribution made by my predecessors as President, in particular Ambassadors de Icaza of Mexico and Yumjav of Mongolia, who worked hard to bring clarity to our debates and to bring delegations' viewpoints closer together, has been of priceless assistance. I thank them very much for having facilitated my task.

Unfortunately, our Conference is still prey to the obstacles and difficulties we have encountered since the beginning of our session. We all know why we are unable to overcome them, and there is no point in dwelling on that. However, I am encouraged by the will shown by all delegations during my consultations to work together to try to solve these problems.

The intensification of the negotiations on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is a legitimate source of satisfaction. The fact that the negotiations have avoided the pitfalls that have characterized the rest of our work is to the credit of all delegations. I would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm our deep gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Dembinski of Poland, and the chairmen of the working groups on verification and institutional matters, Ambassador Norberg of Sweden and Ambassador Ramaker of the Netherlands, for their untiring efforts to move the negotiations forward.

As you know, since I took up the post of President, I have resolutely embarked on a process of intensive bilateral consultations in order to clarify and understand the positions of all delegations on a number of pending issues and to try to bring a solution closer. These individual contacts with all delegations were followed by an informal meeting with all delegations during which I introduced a preliminary report on progress in these consultations, accompanied by a very rewarding exchange of views on all these questions. The usefulness of these consultations has been demonstrated, and I intend to pursue my efforts unstintingly in order to prepare the way for a solution to all the problems. I know that I can count on cooperation from everyone in this task.

On this occasion, allow me to make a few comments which reflect the importance and interest which my country attaches to the Conference on Disarmament and in particular the questions to which we assign priority in its work. The international community has always had great expectations of the Conference on Disarmament. The historic changes which have occurred in the

(The President)

international arena can, we feel, help the Conference to live up to these expectations and to satisfy the profound aspiration for disarmament. Thus it is obvious that the accomplishment of the Conference's task lies in its ability to adapt to the new international equilibria and, in this new context, to devote itself to producing results on the priority issues on its agenda.

First and foremost, we believe that it should be possible for the consensus arrived at during the Conference on the extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, both on the nuclear test ban and on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, to take concrete shape in the work of the Conference. In this respect, the Conference, which is the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, should spare no effort in order to arrive rapidly at a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such a ban will not only help to bring nuclear proliferation under control, but also send an important message on the path to halting the increasing sophistication of nuclear weapons. Only a comprehensive nuclear test ban prohibiting all types of test can meet these objectives. In that regard, the recent statements made by France, the United States and Great Britain are encouraging and should allow us to make real progress in the negotiations under way. By the same token, we hope that all delegations will facilitate agreement on this vital issue of the scope of the treaty and that all efforts can thus be concentrated on the other aspects of the negotiations still under discussion, in particular the establishment of an effective and non-discriminatory verification and monitoring system as well as the formalities for the treaty's entry into force, which should take into account the need to produce a text aiming at universal membership.

In the middle of its current session, thanks to the many efforts and the patience of delegations, the Conference took the decision to set up an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty to prohibit fissile material for weapons purposes. This decision cannot but help to put an end to the threats posed to international security by the accumulation of this material and the propensity to use it for weapons purposes. Therefore, it falls to the Conference to embark on negotiations on this important subject and, in a spirit of harmony and understanding, to ensure that these negotiations meet the various expectations that have been expressed on the matter, consideration of which should cover both the non-proliferation dimension and that of nuclear disarmament.

It is just as important to bear in mind the fact that the ultimate objective of the NPT is nuclear disarmament. This is also a priority for the Conference on Disarmament, and nobody can question the extreme importance of nuclear disarmament and the obligations that arise therefrom for the Conference. It is worth remembering that the international community as a whole attaches high priority to this subject. Thus it is vital to make progress at the multilateral level on such an important issue for the future of mankind. The developments which have accompanied the end of the cold war are indeed encouraging, but it must be noted that such developments are volatile in a rapidly changing world if definitive and mutually accepted solutions are not found to the evils that have been engendered by the nuclear arms race. Consequently, the Conference should take up all the efforts made towards this end. In other words, it should effectively participate in

(The President)

discussions aimed at nuclear disarmament and endow itself with the necessary machinery which will allow it to work to achieve the progress which the international community expects of it on the subject. The Conference could thus open up a debate on the progressive stages which need to be mapped out on the path towards general and complete nuclear disarmament. An in-depth exchange of views on security needs in a world freed of the atomic weapon and on means to achieve this would help to build up a climate of trust, and would in particular enable the nuclear Powers to subscribe to the relevant multilateral efforts.

Among the priorities to which the Conference should also devote itself, we should include the threat of the development of various types of sophisticated weaponry whose very accumulation is a destabilizing factor. The ceaseless development of technologies offers disturbing possibilities for the development of this type of weapon. The Conference's role therefore involves the application of instruments which would prevent such a drift towards the use of high technology for weapons purposes. The development of weapons and their sometimes extensive dissemination not only helps to generate tensions but also in fact deprives many countries of the means to address the priorities they have in the field of economic and social development.

As President of the Conference I shall spare no effort in order to bring together the views which are expressed on the various subjects of concern to us. As President I am available to all delegations and I count on their trust and support to provide solutions to the urgent questions we ought to be tackling. Among these I attach very high priority to the question of expanding the membership of the Conference. There is a need to take full account of new international equilibria and to ensure that all the geopolitical approaches which are expressed and which can contribute to multilateral disarmament coexist within the Conference. The Conference must therefore expand its membership, opening itself up to new members who will certainly provide a valuable and direct contribution to its work. This will also help to expand the Conference's audience at the international level and increase its chances in the implementation of the agreements which would emerge and which would by their nature tend towards universality.

Today the mobilization of all concerned is essential to ensure that the Conference, which is the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, becomes the effective instrument which can play a worthy role to serve the cause of peace through disarmament. My country, which fully subscribes to the principle of global and complete disarmament, in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations Charter, will spare no effort to ensure that the Conference carries out its noble tasks.

I would now like to bid a welcome, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, to the first speaker who is on the list for today, Mr. Jaakko Blomberg, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, who will be speaking to the Conference for the second time this year. His presence among us today is a further indication of his Government's sustained interest in our work and the importance it attaches to this forum.

(The President)

Apart from Mr. Blomberg, I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Poland and Japan, as well as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on the detection and identification of seismic events. I now invite the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Mr. Blomberg, to make his statement.

Mr. BLOMBERG (Finland): Mr. President, let me begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the important office of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I assure you of the Finnish delegation's full cooperation with you in the conduct of your office.

Today, 50 years after mankind learnt of the awesome power of the atom, the international community is anxiously waiting for an end to nuclear test explosions. Nuclear testing was always related to the cold war arms race. As that race is over for good, so should nuclear testing be.

The change in the international situation was recognized by the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May when the Treaty was made permanent. Finland worked actively for permanence. That historic decision, adopted without a vote, as well as the decisions on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and on strengthening the NPT review process, provide a solid basis for further disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

The NPT Conference opened a prospect for rapid conclusion of the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT). There is now good ground to hope that the treaty will be ready for signature by next summer. This should become a shared objective of all participants in the negotiations. Time is short.

A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty will end an era in which more than 2,000 nuclear-weapon test explosions were conducted. The treaty will strengthen nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. For us, the treaty is important on both accounts. At the same time, the treaty will prevent environmental damage that is inherent in any nuclear explosions.

At the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the States parties agreed that, pending the entry into force of a CTBT, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint. Nevertheless, there have already been two new tests by China as well as the decision of France to conduct nuclear tests between September 1995 and May 1996. These regrettable steps highlight the urgency and the importance of a CTBT - the only means to put a definite end to nuclear test explosions. Pending conclusion of the negotiations, we urge all the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from further testing.

The early entry into force of the Treaty should be a key objective. This goal should be borne in mind, inter alia, in negotiating the provisions for entry into force, the establishment of the international monitoring system, financial arrangements and the preparatory phase before entry into force.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

Finland has consistently supported a treaty that would be truly comprehensive, banning any and all nuclear test explosions. We welcome the decisions of France and the United States to support a "true zero" test ban. We hope that this will enable early agreement on the language put forward by Australia on the scope of the treaty.

We oppose any language in the treaty that would leave the door open for so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. Progress could be made here on the basis of the agreement that was recorded in the draft final declaration of the NPT Review and Extension Conference in the part dealing with the article V of the Treaty, which did not give any support for so-called peaceful nuclear explosions.

Our understanding is that imminent preparations for a nuclear test explosion would be prohibited even without an explicit reference to them in the treaty. The treaty machinery should not be powerless if a State party were to engage in such activities.

It is important for the credibility of the test ban to ensure that the treaty will be internationally and effectively verifiable. The international monitoring system (IMS) will have to serve the States parties and the whole international community for decades ahead. In our view, the IMS should be operational at the time of entry into force. Due regard should be given to the need to ensure functional flexibility, efficiency and predictability as well as cost-effectiveness. The framework to be established in the treaty should allow future adjustments in order to ensure the efficiency of the IMS at all times. In our view, the monitoring facilities should be based on existing resources to the extent possible.

We welcome the progress that is being made regarding the funding of the IMS. We believe that the monitoring stations should be mainly owned and operated by individual States parties.

The establishment and operation of the IMS is an unprecedented task that will require extensive cooperation among the States parties. The basic commitment to monitoring, which will be included in the treaty text, should be complemented with agreements between the CTBT organization and individual States parties.

Finland will contribute to the IMS by providing her FINES seismic station as a primary station in the global seismic network. We stand ready to provide additional seismic stations for use as auxiliary stations.

The establishment of the seismic monitoring system will greatly benefit from the work by seismic experts over many years, particularly from the ongoing GSETT-3 test, in which Finland too is participating.

Regarding other monitoring networks, much more work will be required. Finland is ready to offer her radionuclide monitoring stations that fully meet the criteria to be established for use by the IMS. At the moment, we are beginning experimental data transmission from a radionuclide station in Finland to the IDC.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

We believe that most of the ambiguous events detected through the monitoring system can be dealt with adequately through a clarification and consultation process. But it is of fundamental importance for the whole treaty and for all States parties that effective provisions for on-site inspections are in place if compliance with treaty obligations is ever in doubt. We believe that the so-called "red light" procedure should be applied to the first phase of an on-site inspection.

I want to reiterate our support for Vienna as the venue for the CTBT organization. The organization should establish a functional relationship with IAEA that would bring both administrative and cost benefits.

The international community is looking forward to a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We regret that the cut-off negotiations are being held hostage to unrelated questions - two years after the international community gave its support to the negotiations by consensus. We urge the Conference to delink the cut-off negotiations from other issues and to start them without any further delay.

On transparency in armaments, we support the continuation of the exploratory process in which the CD has been engaged during the last couple of years. As a concrete step forward in increasing openness and transparency, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms has proven its usefulness. We have faithfully provided our data to this Register and we urge all other States to do likewise.

We deplore the inability of the Conference to agree on its enlargement. The Conference is duty-bound to respond to the unanimous call by the international community in General Assembly resolution 49/77 B to reach an urgent solution on the expansion. The bottom line of a composition of "at least 60 countries" established by the resolution provides the basis for the Conference to do the right thing. Let me encourage you, Mr. President, in your efforts to come to an agreement that would facilitate the earliest possible implementation of the expansion in accordance with resolution 49/77 B. Let me also reiterate our view that each application for membership should be viewed on its own merits, without being held hostage to extraneous circumstances or outdated balance calculations.

Today, more than ever, disarmament non-proliferation is our common endeavour. This year witnessed the success of the NPT Conference. Next year, we expect the conclusion of the CTBT. We also expect the entry into force of the chemical weapons Convention, and the strengthening of the biological weapons Convention with verification. This is progress that serves the interests of every one of us.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Dembinski.

Mr. DEMBINSKI (Poland): Mr. President, allow me first to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this crucial, concluding part of the current session. I am confident that the competent and businesslike manner in which you have taken over the helm of this body - and which you will not let go until the end of 1995 - augurs well for the prospects of solution of the major outstanding problems of the CD. In your endeavours you will have full support of the Polish delegation.

I should like to take this opportunity to express our warm appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Yumjav of Mongolia, for the excellent manner in which he guided our deliberations last month. I should also like to take this opportunity to warmly welcome the distinguished representatives who have recently joined us in this body: Ambassador Arundhati Ghose of India, Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada and Ambassador Selebi of South Africa. I look forward to close cooperation with them in our common endeavours.

On the departure from Geneva of the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador Gérard Errera, I should like to request the French delegation to convey to him our best wishes for every success in his new assignment. He has left an indelible mark on the CD. We will sorely miss his wisdom and his friendship.

I take great pleasure in informing the Conference on Disarmament that a week ago, on 23 August 1995, the Government of Poland deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations the instrument of ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. At the same time, the Polish authorities are undertaking all the mandatory measures under the Convention relevant to its strict implementation.

The Polish ratification of the CWC brings the total number of States parties to 35, that is, 30 short of the number of ratifications required for the entry into force of the Convention. A major accomplishment of the Conference on Disarmament, the chemical weapons Convention represents an unprecedented multilateral disarmament accord. Its singular character stems not only from the fact that it eliminates a particularly abhorrent and inhumane class of weapons of mass annihilation, but also from the impressive number of its signatories - some 160 members of the international community who have supported it since its opening for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993. In the view of my delegation, the pace of ratification of the CW Convention should be accelerated to secure its earliest entry into effect. Indeed, it would be both desirable and appropriate if the deposit of all 65 requisite ratifications could make the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. I am confident that in this regard the CD members, who legitimately pride themselves on the role they played in the CW negotiations, will not fail to set the example and - if they have not yet done so - will deposit their instruments of ratification as early as possible. This action is indispensable and urgent if the international community is to see the treaty provisions any time soon translated into tangible results of effectively enforced prohibitions and progressive destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles.

(Mr. Dembinski, Poland)

The lessons and experience associated with the CWC negotiations and the current work of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague are very instructive. They should not be ignored as the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban approaches the "end-game" of its negotiations. In my view, we have in fact already entered that crucial phase. We have done so on a highly positive note. The Polish delegation is gratified by the declarations of France, the United States and the United Kingdom concerning the scope of the future test ban. Their unequivocal support of the comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban, along the lines of the Australian draft language contained in document CD/NTB/WP.222, adds critical momentum to the negotiating process. Together with the imaginative and broadly supported United States proposal for IMS funding, these declarations on the key provision of CTBT make the 1996 target date for its conclusion a practical proposition.

Still, despite the growing convergence of views - if not yet full consensus - on key issues, there remain quite a few questions of substance and many loose ends to be tied up. They discourage complacency and a relaxed pace. For this reason, my delegation - like many others - strongly favours inter-sessional work, both in expert format on specific issues and in working group mode. Appropriately timed between the end of the current and the beginning of the next CD sessions, such an accelerated effort should - in our view - aim at a two-fold goal: further streamlining the rolling text that is to emerge from the current stage of the negotiations, and drafting concrete treaty language where it is still missing. The results of the inter-sessional efforts could then provide a useful basis for a purpose-oriented discussion and decisions by the Ad Hoc Committee early in 1996.

That discussion - in our view - should result in the development of a coherent treaty structure, from the preamble down to authentic texts, with "streamlined" provisions, i.e. free of redundancies and dispensable brackets, falling into place. For this to become feasible, from now onwards we need to demonstrate maximum flexibility, good will and a spirit of accommodation. We must also realize that things cannot any longer be put off for later consideration. As the end of the day approaches, there is simply no more time available.

First of all, the growing convergence of views around the formula of a truly comprehensive test ban must be translated into a clear-cut draft of the scope provision. We need to put in draft treaty language many other specific aspects of the CTBT which at this time are still far from agreement. They include questions pertaining to the organization, its governing bodies, the Technical Secretariat and its seat, the possible relationship of the organization to IAEA and many more. Much perseverance will be necessary to develop precise formulae on funding. Last but not least, the basic agreement on the IMS architecture must lead to consensus on the precise form of the respective technology networks. Like many other delegations, we believe that requirements for a cost-effective IMS would best be met by the four-technology monitoring system that could be in place by the time of the entry into force of the CTBT. It is also the view of my delegation that agreement on treaty language of provisions concerning on-site inspection has to be reached before

(Mr. Dembinski, Poland)

the Ad Hoc Committee reconvenes in 1996. Representing part and parcel of the CTBT verification system, on-site inspection must be equipped with a transparent trigger mechanism. That mechanism must be impervious to easy abuse or confusion by changing red and green lights.

Mr. President, to turn away from a subject in which this delegation may tend to see a vested interest, I should like to commend you, as indeed your predecessors, for the determination and skill with which you are bringing the question of the expansion of CD membership to the forefront of our attention. The delegation of Poland considers that your approach to this pressing issue deserves serious consideration. It clearly is an issue whose time has come. You will have our full support in your efforts to reach a long overdue solution in that regard. Let me also express my gratification at your intention to see to it that the forthcoming CD session has before it, from the outset, a concrete programme of work to consider and approve without unnecessary loss of time. While we consider it indispensable for the NTB Ad Committee to continue its central role in the overall CD programme of work next year, we welcome the prospect that its other important aspects will also stand a realistic chance of receiving careful consideration.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now call on the representative of Japan, Ambassador Kurokochi.

Mrs. KUROKOCHI (Japan): Mr. President, at the outset, I should like to congratulate you most warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this critical period. I wish you every success in discharging your important tasks to guide the work of this Conference with a view to resolving all pending issues of the Conference. I pledge the fullest cooperation of my delegation to your endeavour. I should also like to take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Yumjav of Mongolia, for his untiring efforts with which he conducted our work during this month.

At the plenary meeting at the end of the second session of the CD, I emphasized the importance of accelerating the pace of the CTBT negotiations during the third session of the CD. I am pleased to note at this stage of the session that encouraging progress has been made in this regard. I particularly appreciate the political will that some States have shown on critical elements of the treaty, as well as the cooperative spirit of the negotiators and experts which has helped to facilitate progress in many areas of the international monitoring system architecture and to streamline the rolling text.

Today I would like to offer my views as to how our work might be further advanced, particularly by achieving a convergence of views on three specific issues and forging a commitment to a single, common goal. Let me state at the outset that it is of crucial importance to further progress in our negotiations that each State shows the utmost flexibility and clearly commits itself to achieving a convergence of opinions before the first session of the CD in 1996. For this purpose inter-sessional periods should be utilized to the maximum extent possible.

(Mrs. Kurokochi, Japan)

The first point on which a convergence of views must be reached and which is the most central issue of the negotiations is, needless to say, the scope of the treaty. I am pleased to reiterate Japan's appreciation for the recent announcements made by France and the United States in this regard. I also welcome the statement made at this conference by Mr. Roland Smith of the United Kingdom on 17 August, which reaffirmed the United Kingdom's support for the ban on all nuclear explosions. Japan strongly hopes that all nuclear-weapon States will agree unequivocally to a true zero-yield threshold as soon as possible.

Japan has repeatedly stated its position that a CTBT should prohibit all nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and thus supports working paper 222 proposed by Australia. I would like to call upon all negotiating States to support the Australian text. As for peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE), the rationale repeatedly cited is not persuasive because the practicality of its application for peaceful purposes is doubtful and we see no need for such technology. It would be very dangerous to allow such a wide loophole under a CTBT. Japan, therefore, appeals to all States participating in the negotiation to agree at the earliest possible date that the concept of PNE does not have a basis for justification under a CTBT.

The second issue I wish to emphasize concerns verification. Thanks to the contributions of experts and negotiators, significant progress has been made at this session on the IMS architecture. I highly appreciate that an agreement has been made on the number and location of primary stations in a seismic network and believe that a general consensus is emerging on other issues in IMS technologies. I strongly hope that further progress will be made on IMS architecture at the meeting of experts. It is important that experts and negotiators continue their work and make further progress in this field during the coming autumn, and I am confident that every participating State shares this view.

As for on-site inspections, I would hope that a basic agreement will emerge soon on such matters as the basis for OSI requests, on an access regime, and on the relation between consultation and clarification and the OSI process. As regards phasing, we find merits in a two-phase approach as a means to ensure timely implementation of OSI which will facilitate the detection of such time-critical phenomena as the presence of noble gases and aftershocks.

While a consultation and clarification process is important for its own sake as well as in keeping unnecessary inspections to a minimum, I do not share the view expressed by some delegations that a request for consultation and clarification should be a prerequisite to an OSI. Moreover, I do not subscribe to the view that the basis for an OSI request should be limited only to data and information detected by the IMS, since the coverage of the IMS network cannot be 100 per cent comprehensive.

The third issue on which efforts should be made to reach agreement is the question of the seat of a CTBT organization and the organization's relations with IAEA. At the plenary during the second session, I indicated that Japan is favourably considering Vienna as the seat for a CTBT organization. It does

(Mrs. Kurokochi, Japan)

so in the interest of ensuring that it remains a small, efficient and highly cost-effective organization and is able to fully utilize the expertise of IAEA. The Government of Austria's offer to host a CTBT organization is thus, in our view, most welcome. I hope that the exchange of views with Austria will further progress.

It is also encouraging that efforts are under way to study the functions of IAEA and to examine a possible relationship with a CTBT organization. Although I recognize that the specific outlines of the relations between a CTBT organization and other international organizations are yet to be determined, I hope that efforts in this regard will be accelerated so that we can have a concrete basis for a discussion of the matter in the very near future. I cannot but think that convergence of views on the issue of the seat of a CTBT organization, with basic understanding on its appropriate relationship with other organizations, will be an important step to show that the negotiations are in progress.

As stipulated in the Principles and Objectives decided at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the international community has committed itself to completing the CTBT negotiations no later than 1996. But Japan and a number of other countries are advocating that the negotiations should be completed as early as possible in 1996, and not simply by the end of that year. The endorsement of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty by the General Assembly in the fall of 1996 would be a worthy accomplishment for the United Nations, which will have just celebrated its fiftieth anniversary and embarked upon its next half-century of activities.

Permit me to take this opportunity to urge all participating States to make every effort to realize the goal of signing a CTBT by the fall of 1996 at the very latest. This means that it will be necessary to have a clean text available during the second session of the CD in 1996. Considering that an appropriate amount of time must be allowed for technical and procedural arrangements, it is important that we reach an agreement on the substance of the treaty by the beginning of the first session of the CD in 1996. I sincerely hope that all States will summon the political will to conclude the negotiations within this time-frame.

I should now like to explain briefly Japan's activities which have direct relevance to the CTBT, especially the IMS. Utilizing its financial resources and the experience it has gained in seismology, Japan has been engaged in the education and training in this field of experts from other countries. It is gratifying to note that experts who have participated in these training programmes have gone on to become members of and active participants in the GSE.

Once a CTBT enters into force, it will be essential to improve global monitoring technology based on seismology. Japan is planning in this fiscal year to launch a new programme in an effort to enhance the capability of other countries to detect nuclear tests. Under this programme, five trainees from various countries will be invited to participate each year; applications are now being accepted for the first group.

(Mrs. Kurokochi, Japan)

With regard to funding for the IMS, Japan joins those delegations which have expressed their basic support for the new position outlined by the United States. Japan is of the view that each State should assume its share of the responsibility in a new international regime, and is ready to bear its proper share according to an appropriate international scale.

Before concluding my remarks, I would like to touch briefly upon two issues not related to the CTBT. First, with regard to the cut-off treaty negotiations, I believe it is important to select a chairman for the Ad Hoc Committee and begin negotiations during this session and continue them in 1996. It is my hope that this question can be resolved as soon as possible under your presidency. The second issue concerns CD expansion. I share the concern with my colleagues regarding this issue, and it is our hope that the President will do his utmost to guide us to reach an appropriate solution. I would like to assure you of our readiness to cooperate fully with you in this endeavour.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Japan for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair. I now call on the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts for the detection and identification of seismic events, Dr. Dahlman, who will present the Group's progress report on its forty-first session, which bears the symbol CD/1341.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): The progress report of the recent session of the Ad Hoc Group contained in CD/1341, is in front of you. Scientific experts and representatives from 34 countries attended the session. I would from the outset like to express the Group's appreciation for the eminent services provided by the secretariat during this session and prior to it in support of our efforts to increase participation in GSETT-3.

The Ad Hoc Group is now focusing its attention on the conduct and the evaluation of GSETT-3. This large-scale global test, which began its full-scale operation on 1 January 1995, had, as stated in CD/1254, the following main objectives: to develop and test concepts for an international seismic monitoring system; to provide a practical basis upon which to furnish the CD with timely technical information; and finally to develop an experimental system that can evolve and adapt to support future requirements that may be specified for an international seismic monitoring system.

The concept of an experimental seismic monitoring system being tested during GSETT-3 includes a single IDC for data collection, routine analysis and distribution of results, a global network of some 50 primary stations to provide on-line data continuously for event detection and preliminary location and some 100-150 auxiliary stations to be used for improved event location and characterization. The purpose of GSETT-3 is thus not to establish an operational system, but rather to provide knowledge and experience to facilitate decisions on the final IMS system and thereby reduce the uncertainties and the risks involved.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

GSETT-3 is now providing results, which makes it possible for the GSE to draw a number of concrete conclusions which are summarized in the progress report. I will draw your attention to some of those having more general interest.

The experimental IDC in Arlington, Virginia, United States, has, with few interruptions, been in continuous operation since 1 January 1995. As of 18 August this year, 37 primary and 75 auxiliary stations are participating in the experiment. This participation is detailed in the progress report. Information provided during the session indicates that 5 primary stations are likely to be added to the experiment before the end of September 1995 and another 5 later this year, thus bringing the number of primary stations to 47 towards the end of this year.

Although the global coverage is presently uneven and the number of stations currently falls short of that envisioned when the experiment was planned, it is possible to start drawing conclusions of a practical nature on several aspects of the ISMS. Many of the conclusions are based on observational data from regions where the station coverage corresponds to what was originally planned. These, sometimes limited, observations are supplemented by theoretical modelling.

An important conclusion is that, from a technical perspective, the overall concept of a system based on a single IDC, NDCs in participating States and a two-tiered network of primary and auxiliary stations is an efficient concept for an international seismic monitoring system.

It has also been demonstrated that a single IDC, of the size and structure now being tested, can fulfil the required tasks of collecting data routinely and on-line from the primary stations and when required from the auxiliary station through an automatic request procedure. The issues of redundancy, reliability and data security are most important and GSETT-3 is expected to provide further experience on these issues useful in the final design of the ISMS.

It has further been demonstrated that the IDC can routinely analyse the seismological data anticipated in the ISMS and in a timely manner provide useful analysis products to participating States. Additional work is, however, needed to further develop methods to provide parameters to characterize observed events and to provide user-friendly products.

The seismological stations are key elements of a seismic network. The experiment has shown the importance of having stations installed at locations where the background disturbances are low. It has further confirmed the necessity for stations to meet defined minimum technical requirements. GSETT-3 has also shown the value of upgrading three-component stations to arrays. The Group concludes that seismic arrays at low-noise sites will be the most valuable type of installation in the primary seismic network of an IMS.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

There has been a costly and lengthy effort to establish the infrastructure needed for GSETT-3, including high-quality stations, NDCs, the International Data Centre and the communication links. The Group considers it essential that the operation of key elements of this infrastructure that could contribute to the future IMS be maintained.

The Working Group on Verification has agreed on a list of 50 primary seismic stations to be included in the ISMS. Twenty-seven of these stations are already operational and participating in GSETT-3 and nine more are expected to be included before the end of the year. Efforts are also under way to establish the majority of the remaining stations.

The fact that it will be possible to utilize so many of the facilities existing today in the ISMS will most significantly reduce the need for new investments. The total investment cost for all the facilities planned for GSETT-3 is US\$ 180 million, out of which facilities with an estimated value of US\$ 150 million are already established. GSETT-3 has confirmed earlier estimates that the yearly operational costs for the primary and the auxiliary stations, the communication links and the IDC are about US\$ 30 million.

In addition to technical experiences, GSETT-3 is also beginning to provide scientific results and demonstration of operational capabilities. As such analysis takes time and requires large amounts of data and good operational coverage, the conclusions are so far preliminary.

The first such conclusion is that it takes considerable operational experience to achieve the full potential capability of a seismic monitoring network. In other words it takes time and effort to fine-tune the system and its components, to adjust the stations and the processing methods to obtain an optimized system. Steps towards such an optimization are continuously taken as GSETT-3 proceeds.

When it comes to detection capability, it is concluded that in regions of the world such as North America, northern Europe and Australia, in which the planned primary network is nearly complete, events with magnitude of 3.5 to 4.0 are detected with high probability. This supports and gives confidence in the theoretical estimates to the global detection capability earlier made by the Group. In regions of the world where the station coverage still is incomplete, the current capability is significantly lower.

In particular, GSETT-3 has shown that the current seismological network is inadequate for monitoring the southern oceanic areas. It might therefore be essential to use data from a hydroacoustic network in conjunction with seismic data to monitor events in these areas. More work is needed on this topic.

The capability of accurately locating observed events is most important in CTBT monitoring. To obtain high location accuracy you need stations in various azimuths around the actual event and accurate, that is well-calibrated, models for the velocity of seismic waves in the actual region. In this respect, the Ad Hoc Group reached the important conclusion that a combination of the primary network and an auxiliary network should be

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

able to achieve a location accuracy of within 1,000 square kilometres. In the well-covered regions of the world the location error of the primary network is estimated to be 20-50 km for seismic events of magnitude 4. The use of auxiliary stations can reduce this to 15-25 km, based on GSETT-3 experience in the same areas. Previous work has demonstrated that the location uncertainty can be further reduced by calibration of the network using events for which the location is known or accurately estimated from a local seismic network.

GSETT-3 will provide further information on the extent to which auxiliary stations are needed to provide a location accuracy within 1,000 square kilometres and thus on the required distribution of such stations globally. GSETT-3 will also demonstrate, in selected regions, the improvements in location accuracy that can be obtained using calibration events.

The conduct of GSETT-3 requires comprehensive documentation. The operational manuals compiled for seismic stations, national data centres and the International Data Centre have proven to be essential to guide and support the experiment. These manuals should also prove useful models for the operations manual for the ISMS.

The successful conduct of GSETT-3 is dependent on dedicated efforts of well-trained personnel around the globe working in close cooperation. In particular the experience from the international team at the International Data Centre is most satisfactory. GSETT-3 has demonstrated the importance of training of staff at national data centres and at the International Data Centre. This training is already taking place and should continue and be expanded. We heard the distinguished representative of Japan touching upon their programme.

GSE is critically dependent on informal work going on between the sessions. This includes routine operation of the experimental system as well as informal workshops and seminars. The Group noted with appreciation the convening of an informal technical workshop "From GSETT-3 to IMS" in Baltimore, Maryland, United States in late June 1995. The workshop was attended by 55 experts from 20 countries. The objective of the workshop was to stimulate discussion on the evaluation and evolution of GSETT-3 and to consider ways to facilitate the transition on the basis of the experience gained from GSETT-3 to meet the needs of the CD and of the future organization to be established under a CTBT.

The Group also noted with appreciation the convening of two informal technical seminars. One was conducted in Zurich, Switzerland in early June 1995 on "Design, usage and implementation of an automatic data exchange manager". This seminar, which considered common procedures for automatic data exchange, was attended by 18 experts from 12 countries. The second seminar was held in Bruyères-le-Chatel, France in mid-July 1995 and was attended by 17 experts from seven European countries. The aim of this seminar was to review initial results of what is called the EURO-BULL experiment, which is an effort to produce a high-quality European seismic bulletin. Such high-quality regional or national bulletins are of great importance for the evaluation of GSETT-3 and might prove valuable also in connection with an ISMS.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

I would also like to acknowledge the initiative announced by the delegation of Argentina in the CD on 17 August to host a regional workshop for diplomats and seismic experts to strengthen participation on the South American continent in GSETT-3 and in the international verification system for a CTBT. Efforts are also under way to convene a similar workshop in Africa.

In discussing its future plans the Group took into account the views expressed by the Chairman of the NTB Committee's Working Group on Verification when briefing the Group. The Group agreed on a work programme and schedule presented in the progress report. This work programme contains three main issues: the development of the GSETT-3 system, the evaluation and completion of GSETT-3 and the transition following the GSETT-3 experience.

As to the development of the GSETT-3 system, there will be a continuation of the step-by-step implementation of new facilities around the world. Priority will be given to implementing the remaining primary stations agreed upon by the NTB Working Group on Verification and improving the global network of auxiliary stations. The International Data Centre will continue its daily service, develop its processing methods and, most important, develop its products to include additional parameters that characterize the observed events. The goal is to develop user-friendly IDC products that are useful to support national verification needs.

The GSE will further complete a comprehensive evaluation of the first year of the GSETT-3 experiment, with emphasis on specific issues of importance to define the IMS. Such issues include the network of auxiliary stations, network calibration, the characterization parameters and improved capability estimates.

The GSE will also examine the issues to be addressed in a transition from GSETT-3 to IMS operations. The GSE will develop a plan to address these issues and would thus be prepared for a possible request by the Conference on Disarmament.

To be responsive to the needs of the NTB Committee and especially its Working Group on Verification, the Group decided to intensify its efforts to provide information relevant to the negotiations in a timely manner. The Ad Hoc Group therefore suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 27 November to 1 December 1995, followed by a session from 12 to 23 February 1996.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Mr. Dahlman for introducing this report. I intend to submit to the Conference for approval the recommendation contained in paragraph 14 of the report concerning the dates for the Group's coming sessions, at a subsequent plenary meeting of the Conference.

I have come to the end of the list of speakers for today. Would any other delegation like to take the floor at this stage?

(The President)

I see none, and therefore I would now like to inform you of my intentions concerning the organization of our work for the coming weeks. As you know, the immediate task to which we will have to address ourselves will be to consider the draft annual report of the Conference to the next session of the United Nations General Assembly. In accordance with the provisions of the rules of procedure of the Conference, I have, with the assistance of the secretariat, prepared a draft of that report which is contained in document CD/WP.466. This document has been distributed today in English in delegations' pigeon-holes, and it will be available in all languages on Monday, 4 September. With your agreement, therefore, I intend to start consideration of this report at an informal meeting that we will hold immediately after the plenary meeting on Tuesday, 5 September 1995.

In response to the incessant appeals made by the members of the Conference, as well as many others in this room, concerning the question of expansion, I hope to be able to submit a positive report on this subject next week and perhaps a draft decision on the subject. I think I can tell you today that I am optimistic, and I hope I will still be optimistic after consulting all the members of the Conference on this matter.

I would now like to turn to the informal paper distributed by the secretariat containing the timetable of meetings for the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. This timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As usual it is merely indicative in nature and can be changed if necessary. On this understanding, I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The next plenary meeting of the Conference will take place on Tuesday, 5 September 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.